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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Tapia-Lopez argued that the Idaho Supreme Court 
denied him due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the 
record on appeal with transcripts of the change of plea hearing, held on June 28, 2010, 
the sentencing hearing, held on August 11, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on 
January 10, 2011. Mr. Tapia-Lopez argues that the requested transcripts are necessary 
for his appeal because the district court could utilize its own memory of the prior 
proceedings when it executed a sentence after revocation of probation. In response, 
the State argues that the only relevant transcript is the one from the final probation 
disposition hearing. 
This brief is necessary to address the State's assertion that the requested 
transcripts are not relevant to the issues on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-10.) 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez argues that the requested transcripts are relevant because a district 
court can rely on its own memory of the prior proceedings when it decides to execute a 
sentence upon revoking probation. Since Idaho appellate courts conduct an 
independent review of the entire record when determining whether a district court 
abused its discretion in regard to a sentencing determination, what was specifically 
presented to the district court at a probation violation disposition hearing does not define 
the scope of review concerning the sentencing issue. The only questions are: whether 
the information at issue was before the district court at any of the prior hearings, and 
whether that information is relevant to the sentencing issues on appeal. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Tapia-Lopez's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, 
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Tapia-Lopez due process and equal 
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez's oral 
Rule 35 motion requesting leniency? 
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ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary 
Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making 
sentencing decisions. Due to this broad range of information considered, Idaho 
appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants to provide an extensive 
appellate record because they conduct an independent review of the entire record 
before the district court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in 
regard to a sentencing determination. In other words, the question on appeal generally 
does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered. Instead, the 
central question is whether the record before the district court supports its sentencing 
determination. 
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information that was 
before the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing 
information supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of 
the issue. In some instances, the Court of Appeals has refused to address the merits of 
issues on appeal due to the appellants' failure to provide transcripts of hearings which 
were never discussed by the district court and occurred years before the disposition of 
the issue on appeal. 
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B. In The Event This Case Is Assigned To The Court Of Appeals, The Court Of 
Appeals Has The Authority To Address The Issues Raised In The Appellant's 
Brief 
1. The Idaho Rules Of Appellate Procedure Require The Idaho Court Of 
Appeals To Address The Issues Raised In Mr. Tapia-Lopez's Appeal 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Tapia-Lopez argued that the denial of his request for 
the transcripts violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protections 
clauses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-18.) In response, the State argued, based on State v. 
Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), that the Court of Appeals does not have the 
authority to address Mr. Tapia-Lopez's due process argument because it is without 
authority to review a decision made by the Idaho Supreme Court. (Respondent's Brief, 
p.6 n3.) Contrary to the State's assertion, Idaho Appellate Rule 108 requires the Court 
of Appeals to rule on the merits of all cases to which it is assigned by the Supreme 
Court. 1 The relevant portions of I.AR. 108 state as follows: 
Cases Reserved to Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals shall hear and 
decide all cases assigned to it by the Supreme Court; provided that the 
Supreme Court will not assign the following cases: 
(1) Proceedings invoking the original jurisdiction of the Idaho 
Supreme Court; 
(2) Appeals from imposition of sentences of capital punishment in 
criminal cases; 
(3) Appeals from the Industrial Commission; 
(4) Appeals from the Public Utilities Commission; 
(5) Review of the recommendatory orders of the Board of 
Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar; 
1 In State v. Cornelison, 2013 Published Opinion 22 (Ct. App. April 11, 2013), the Court 
of Appeals rejected a virtually identical argument. However, Cornelison is not yet final, 
and Mr. Tapia-Lopez disagrees with the holding in that case. 
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(6) Review of recommendatory orders of the Judicial Council. 
(emphasis added). Since the issues raised in Mr. Tapia-Lopez's Appellant's Brief do not 
fall into any of the foregoing categories, the Idaho Court of Appeals has the authority to 
address the issues raised in his Appellant's Brief. 
Further, an assignment of this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an 
implicit grant of authority from the Idaho Supreme Court to review Mr. Tapia-Lopez's 
claims about the constitutionality of the merits of its decision to deny his request for the 
transcripts. The Supreme Court will be aware of Mr. Tapia-Lopez's due process and 
equal protection issue when it makes it decision to either keep this appeal or assign it to 
the Court of Appeals. This position is bolstered by the Internal Rules of the Supreme 
Court. Specifically, I.R.S.C. 21, which governs the assignment of cases. The language 
of I.R.S.C. 21 follows: 
Assignment of Cases. The chief justice (or designee) shall make the 
tentative assignment of cases as between the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeals. Copies of each assignment sheet shall be given to the 
justices, affording each an opportunity to object and request the Court to 
reconsider the assignment. 
Any objection to the assignment shall be stated, with reasons, in writing 
and circulated to all the justices. 
At the request of any justice, the objection to the assignment shall be 
taken up at conference. 
The assignment of cases is not an arbitrary process; according to the Rule, it is a 
deliberate process which affords all the justices the ability to object and provide input 
into the decision to assign a case to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court will be aware of Mr. Tapia-Lopez's due process and equal protection arguments 
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when it makes the decision to either keep this case or assign this case to the Court of 
Appeals. In the event this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court 
will be implicitly granting the Court of Appeals authority to address the merits of 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez's claims of error. 
In sum, when the Idaho Supreme Court assigns an appeal to the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, the Idaho Appellate Rules require the Court of Appeals to decide all issues 
addressed in that appeal. Even though Mr. Tapia-Lopez is challenging the 
constitutionality of the Supreme Court's decision to deny his request for the transcripts, 
an assignment of this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an implicit grant of 
authority from the Idaho Supreme Court to review all issues raised in the Appellant's 
Brief. 
2. An Assignment Of This Case to An Appellate Tribunal With No Authority To 
Address Mr. Tapia-Lopez's Claims Of Error Will Violate His Right To 
Procedural Due Process On Appeal 
In the event the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this case to the Court of Appeals 
and it determines that the Court of Appeals does not have the authority to address all of 
the issues Mr. Tapia-Lopez's raised in his appellant's brief, he argues, in the alternative, 
that such assignment will function as a separate denial of his federal due process rights, 
which guarantee him a fair appeal.2 The Constitutions of both United States and the 
State of Idaho guarantee a criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV; ID Const. art. 1 § 13. 
2 In Cornelison, supra, the Court of Appeals rejected a virtually identical argument. 
However, Cornelison is not yet final, and Mr. Tapia-Lopez disagrees with the holding in 
that case. 
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It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132 
Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
While there is no federal guarantee to an appeal from criminal state court 
proceedings, after a state decides to provide appellate review, the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable during the 
entirety of the appellate proceedings. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). In 
Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See I.C. § 19-2801. 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in Idaho 
Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an 
appeal of right as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (c)(6). See State v. Fuller, 104 
Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (an order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under 
Rule 35 is an appealable order pursuant to I.AR. 11 (c)(6)). 
In this case, Mr. Tapia-Lopez argues that due process protections apply to every 
stage of his appeal. Those protections apply to any appellate procedural decision made 
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by the Idaho Supreme Court. Even though Mr. Tapia-Lopez does not have an 
independent right to appeal from the order denying his motion to augment, he can 
challenge the constitutionality of the order because it is a procedural component of his 
appeal and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause applies to all procedures 
affecting his appeal. If the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this appeal to the Idaho Court 
of Appeals, knowing that the Court of Appeals had no authority to reverse an order of 
the Supreme Court, a unique and independent procedural due process violation will 
occur because the Supreme Court will have precluded Mr. Tapia-Lopez from any state 
procedure by which he could raise his federal constitutional claims challenging the 
denial of his motion to augment. 
C. The Requested Transcripts Are Relevant Because Of The Applicable Standard of 
Review And The Court Of Appeals' Presumption That The District Court Would 
Utilize Its Own Memory Of The Prior Proceedings When It Denied Mr. Tapia-
Lopez's Oral Rule 35 Motion 
The State argues that the requested transcript is not relevant to the issue on 
appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-10.) State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26 (Ct. App. 
2009) made it clear what standard of review is applicable when the question on appeal 
is what the appropriate sentence should be after probation is revoked.3 In that case, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals resolved an ongoing dispute about the proper standard of 
review in probation revocation cases. Id. at 27. Relying on State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 
3 Mr. Tapia-Lopez is appealing from the district court's order revoking probation, and 
raising on appeal the district court's decision to deny his oral Rule 35 motion. When the 
district court denied that motion it was determining the appropriate sentence to execute 
after revoking probation. As such, the standard of review articulated in Hanington is 
applicable to the question of whether the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez's oral Rule 35 motion. 
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520, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2008), and State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392 (Ct. App. 1992), the 
State sought to limit review to only facts that had arisen between the original 
pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation proceedings. Hanington, 148 Idaho 
at 28. Essentially, the State's position would have eliminated any need for appellate 
courts to review the change of plea hearing transcript, the sentencing transcript, and the 
presentence report, because all of that information would have been available to the 
district court prior to the original sentencing hearing. See id. Hanington argued that the 
proper standard of review should include a review of "all facts existing both at the time 
of the original sentence and at the time the sentence is ordered into execution," relying 
on the standard established in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-1056 (Ct. App. 
1989). Id. at 27. The Court of Appeals agreed with Hanington and held: 
Id. 
The State has read our somewhat differing versions of the scope of review 
too restrictively. We have not intended to suggest that our review is limited 
solely to events occurring between the original imposition of sentence and 
the decision to order the sentence into execution. When we review a 
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we 
will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the 
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation. 
The Hanington Court made it clear that when determining what sentence to 
execute, the appellate court would review the entire record, including the factors at the 
original sentencing hearing through the probation revocation before the court on appeal. 
The rationale behind this clarification makes perfect sense when looking to State v. 
Adams, the decision that explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire 
record when reviewing the executed sentence: 
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[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution 
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially 
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The 
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events 
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing 
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a 
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant 
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, 
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an 
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the 
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on 
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a 
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a 
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see 
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the 
appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. As such, when an appellant files an appeal from an 
order revoking probation and challenges the length of his/her sentence, the applicable 
standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry to the events 
which occurred prior to as well as the events which occurred during the probation 
revocation proceedings. The basis for this standard of review is that the judge "naturally 
and quite properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant 
facts in reaching a decision." Id. Based on that presumption, the Court of Appeals held 
that, "When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same facts." Id. The Court 
of Appeals did not hold that the district court must expressly reference the prejudgment 
events at the probation disposition hearing in order for this standard of review to 
become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals presumed the judge will 
automatically consider the prejudgment events when determining whether to execute or 
reduce a sentence after revoking probation. 
11 
The State also argues that the requested transcript was never presented to the 
district court and, therefore, was never part of the record before the district court and 
cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) 
Contrary to the State's position, the question of whether the transcripts of the requested 
proceedings were before the district court at the time of the hearing from which 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez is appealing is not relevant in deciding whether the transcripts are 
relevant to the issues on appeal. That is because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a 
district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the proceeding 
from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained 
from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 
(Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the 
findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard 
during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could 
rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has 
observed in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein 
involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing 
court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously 
dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he 
already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearing was 
transcribed is irrelevant, because the district court could rely upon the information it 
already knew from presiding over the hearings at issue. Moreover, in Adams, supra, the 
Court of Appeals presumed that the district court would rely upon such information and, 
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therefore, it needed transcripts of the prior proceedings to consider the same facts 
presumptively utilized by the district court. 
Additionally, the State's position is unworkable because all transcripts, except a 
transcript of the hearing from which an appeal is taken, would be deemed new 
information. This is inconsistent with the holding from State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 
276 (Ct. App. 2000), where the district court examined the defendant about his guilty 
plea during the change of plea hearing. Since the defendant in Burdett failed to provide 
a transcript of that hearing on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed that something 
occurred in that hearing which supported the district court's sentencing decision. Id. 
If the State's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, a transcript of a 
defendant's original sentencing hearing would be new information in instances where an 
appeal is filed from a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. Further, if that is new 
information, a district court should not, absent a transcript, consider what happened at 
sentencing when evaluating a Rule 35 motion. However, in State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 
451, 452-453 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address the merits 
of an appeal from the denial of an Rule 35 motion because the appellant failed to 
provide the PSI and a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the appellate record. See 
also State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984). 
In sum, the Hanington Opinion controls the applicable standard of review when a 
sentence is challenged after a period of probation. As such, the requested transcripts 
are relevant to the sentencing issue raised on appeal, and lack of access to those 
transcripts will preclude a merits based review of his sentencing issue. 
13 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez's Oral Rule 35 
Motion Requesting Leniency 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues, based on State v. Huffman, 144 
Idaho 201 (2007), that this Court has no ability to review Mr. Tapia-Lopez's claim that 
the district court abused its discretion when it denied his oral Rule 35 motion because 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez did not provide any new information which was not before the district 
court at sentencing. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-14.) Contrary to the State's position, 
the holding in Huffman is not applicable in this matter due to the differing procedural 
postures of this matter and Huffman. 
In Huffman, the defendant was appealing from a Rule 35 motion requesting 
leniency, which was filed after the original judgment of conviction. Id. at 202. Based on 
that specific procedural posture, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Rule 35 motions 
must be supported by new or additional information to prevent Rule 35 motions from 
functioning as an appeal from a sentence and, thus, circumventing I.AR. 14(a)'s 
requirement that an appeal be filed within forty days from a final judgment. Id. That 
concern is not applicable when a defendant requests a sentence reduction at a 
probation disposition hearing because the defendant must file an appeal from the denial 
of an oral Rule 35 motion within forty two days from the order revoking probation. I.AR. 
14(a). Moreover, there will always be new information when an oral Rule 35 motion is 
made at a probation violation disposition hearing because all of the events which 
occurred during the most recent period of probation constitutes new information. It can 
also be argued that Mr. Tapia-Lopez's request for a sentence reduction is, in substance, 
not an oral Rule 35 motion, but rather a request that the district court exercise its 
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inherent Rule 35 power to reduce a sentence after revoking probation. See State v. 
Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003). 
In sum, the Huffman new information requirement is not applicable when an oral 
Rule 35 motion is made at probation violation disposition hearing, because an appeal 
from the denial of such a motion must be made within forty two days from the order 
revoking probation as per I.A.R. 14(a). As such, the Huffman Court's concern that Rule 
35 motion will be used to circumvent I.AR. 14(a) is not applicable when oral Rule 35 
motions are made at probation violation disposition hearings. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Tapia Lopez 
respectfully requests that this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence. 
Alternatively, Mr. Tapia Lopez requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate. 
DATED this 3rd day of June, 2013 . 
. ~· 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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